In the modern information society the success or failure of a person participating in activities related to legal issues depends increasingly more on the relevance and correctness of available information and this is why higher demands are put on giving out information. In the context of company law it is evident that although the company is always liable for the information issued, in reality it is not the legal person giving out information, but its legal representative (the director) instead. Therefore, it would be reasonable to ask whether the director could simply hide behind the company; or, should the director also be held personally liable for disclosing untrue statements? The aim of this article is, on the basis of English, German, Spanish and Estonian law, to analyze if and in which cases a director can be held personally liable for disclosing false information to a third party in the name of a company and what the optimal standard of a directors' liability for disclosing false
INTRODUCTION
In principle, directors 1 are not liable to companies' obligations. If they have acted in the name of the company then their personal liability to third parties is generally precluded. However, the director`s right of representation gives him/her unlimited authority to act on behalf of the company, which may tempt the director to start using that authority for his/her own benefit or in the interests of connected persons. By taking into consideration essential public interests, such as the reliability of economic activities of a company, fairness in distribution and social peace, most legislators have steadily moved towards making the duties and liability of directors stricter. 2 However, in light of the economic crisis that has been troubling Europe for a few years now, it is reasonable to ask about the sensible boundaries of directors' liability-which criteria of liability would be best in the sense that directors would not be fearful of taking business risks, but at the same time legitimate interests of third parties would be sufficiently protected as well?
An important group of cases where interests of third parties may be damaged through fulfilment of directors' functions is related to giving out false information.
Through violation of trust and issuance of false information the director may cause substantial damage to creditors and investors of the company. Causing damage by using untrue statements is especially relevant due to rapid development of information technology where all kind of information plays a more important part in decision-making than ever before.
The article uses a comparative analysis of English, German, Spanish and Estonian law to explore the tortious liability of directors to third parties deriving from disclosure of false information. 3 From the mentioned countries English law represents the common law legal system; German and Spanish law, however, respectively represent the Germanic and Romanic legal families. Analysis of Estonian law reveals the situation of a former Soviet Union republic in comparison to the above mentioned countries; more specifically, in what way has the issue of 1 To explain the term used: in countries studied in the article the counterparts of a well-known 'director' of the English law are 'Geschäftsführer' in a GmbH or 'Vorstandsmitglied' in an AG in Germany, 'administrador' in Spain and 'juhatuse liige' (the member of the management board) in Estonia. For better readability, the term 'director' is used throughout the article. 2 
Felix Steffek, Gläubigerschutz in der Kapitalgesellschaft [Creditors Protection in a Company] (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 2011), p. 261-262. 3 For the purpose of this article third parties are primarily company's creditors and persons who have started precontractual negotiations with the company, including persons who have started negotiations in order to acquire company's shares or securities and who might need to file a tortious claim against the director. The nature of a debt relationship between existing shareholders and directors (whether it is tortious, contractual or `some other` debt relationship) deserves a separate thorough analysis and is, therefore, not analysed in the article.
THE DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL DISCLOSURE OF FALSE INFORMATION
An economy can function successfully if parties to economic circulation trust each other. Not all data related to transactions can always be verified and often parties have no other option but to base their decisions on confirmations received from the other party to the transaction. If there was no trust between parties, no transactions would be concluded and economic circulation as a whole would cease to function. The purpose of civil law is to guarantee protection of parties to economic circulation while interfering with people's discretion as little as possible.
Therefore, holding offenders liable in situations where they have disclosed false information, but no harm to other parties has been caused is not advisable. Also, it
would not be practical for law to interfere with all cases of disclosure of untrue statements, but simply with more 'severe' violations. 4 The development of ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1 2014
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Intentional disclosure of false information to another party is the gravest form of disclosure of untrue statements and in all countries studied in the article it can form a basis for holding the offender liable. Intentional deceit may also give ground to rescission of a transaction. 6 In case of nullity of transaction the plaintiff's claim for damage may lapse if, for example, the transaction is fully reversible. However, nullity of transaction does not rule out filing a claim for damage if damage exists.
7
If a director has caused damage to a third party by disclosing false information then it is primarily seen as a basis for company's liability to third persons. 8 Within its internal relationship the company may in turn file a recourse claim. 9 However, if the company is unable to fulfil the claim for damage, the question arises of whether the third party could file its tortuous claim directly against the director instead?
English law does not permit a director to hide behind the vicarious liability of his company where he is fraudulent. 10 In There is a similar provision in Estonian law in art 31(5) of the General Part of the Civil Code Act. English courts do not proceed from the organ theory; however, general rules of representation (law of agency) also place liability first of all on the principal (Felix Steffek, supra note 2, p. 259). 9 If a director is also held liable for the damage caused then, for example, in German law whole liability will fall solely on the director within the internal relationship based on an analogy with art 840 (2) In the legal systems of the other countries under consideration here, there is no corresponding specific basis for tortious claim; however, that does not mean that the director is not held liable for deceit in those countries. In German, Spanish and Estonian law directors' deceit cases are solvable through general tortious bases of liability.
In German law a director may be held personally liable for deceiving a creditor if the director intentionally behaves contrary to good morals. 18 13 There are, however, some exceptions: a defendant may be held liable for stating half-truth, in case only partial information was disclosed about some circumstances and the part that was left unsaid would have negated the disclosed information. Also, the defendant may be held liable if he/she disclosed truthful information that became false later on and the defendant did not warn the creditor. In addition, directors' obligation to disclose information may derive from a statute, e.g., Securities Market Regulation (Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin`s Tort Law, 5 th ed. (New York: Oxford, 2003), p 502). 14 Felix Steffek, supra note 2, p. 572. In case of a company's bankruptcy a director may be, however, held personally liable on the basis of the Insolvency Act (IA), 1986, s 214. The basis for compensation obligation in the insolvency is, however, not so much disclosure of untrue statements (or failure to disclose important information), but failure to fulfil other statutory duties (in English law: wrongful trading according to the IA 1986, s 214; in Germany, Estonia and Spain: violation of the duty to file a bankruptcy petition). The issue of directors' bankruptcy liability remains outside the scope of this article. 15 17 In some exceptional instances English courts have found that lost profit should be compensated when the plaintiff is able to prove that a particular income stream would have been guaranteed for him/her if the defendant had not committed deceit (Simon Deakin, Angus Johnston, and Basil Markesinis, supra note 13, p. 505). 18 In Germany, when damage has been caused to a third party by deliberate reporting of false information, the third party is allowed to claim compensation from the director for the negative interest. 25 In Spain deceit (dolo) takes place when one contracting party induces the other contracting party with malicious acts to conclude a contract which would not have been concluded otherwise. 26 Deceit presumes deliberate acts from one contracting party in order to subject the other contracting party to its will and create a fraudulent representation of reality in his/her mind. 27 There must be a cause-and-effect relationship between such actions and the contractual decisions of the other party and those actions must also have determinative importance on the decisions made. 28 If the misdeed of the other contracting party is caused by his/her own negligence in verifying information which is easily accessible, it may give grounds to discharging the defendant from liability. ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1 2014
78
In order to ascertain intent, the offender's will to commit an unlawful deed must be proven. Similarly to German law, the offender's intent does not necessarily have to be aimed at damaging the injured party 32 and it is not required that the offender has foreseen all possibly harmful consequences of his/her activities. It is enough if it has been established that the offender was aware of the fact that his/her act or omission is unlawful and may cause damage to the injured party. 33 As in German law, intentional behaviour contrary to good morals forms an independent basis of a tortious claim in Estonian law as well. Article 1045 (1)(8) of the LOA provides that the causing of damage is unlawful if, above all, the damage is caused by intentional behaviour contrary to good morals. 34 The Estonian Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated that an act or deed that is in accordance with good morals may become contrary to good morals if the offender's aim to cause damage to the injured party is established. 35 The judicial practice so far has, however,
shown that, as a rule, it is impossible for an injured party to prove the intent of damage.
36
If the deed is already contrary to good morals in its nature, the injured party does not have to prove that the offender wished to damage the injured party with direct intent similarly to other countries studied in the article. It is enough if the person who intentionally acted contrary to good morals understood or had to understand that his/her actions may cause damage to the injured party and due to that an unlawful consequence occurred. 37 As in Germany, it is at the discretion of courts to decide in each separate case whether disclosure of untrue statements by a director is contrary to good morals in its nature. But unlike Germany, there is not much legal practice in that matter in Estonia yet and for that reason it is difficult to point out general criteria on the basis of which courts could decide whether defendants' behaviour is contrary to good morals or not in each separate case. The authors are of the opinion that Estonian judicial practice should proceed from the notion that not every exaggeration in disclosure of information is contrary to good morals. Also, disclosure of untrue statements that did not have determinative importance on the injured party from the viewpoint of conclusion of the contract should not be considered contrary to 32 good morals either. 38 The injured party's own contributory fault should form a basis for decreasing the defendant's liability only if the injured party's intent or gross negligence is proven. 39 Only deliberate disclosure of false information that was of decisive importance to the injured party during the conclusion of the transaction, meaning that the injured party would not have concluded the transaction at all or would have done it on significantly different terms if he/she had known the correct circumstances, should be considered as contrary to good morals.
As seen above, personal liability of a director for intentional disclosure of untrue statements is possible in each of the countries studied in the article. 38 If the disclosure of false information has only insignificant effect on the decision of the injured party or has no effect at all, liability of a director must be denied due to lack of cause-and-effect relationship between the violation and damage. 39 According to information available to the authors, the issue of injured party's contributory fault has not been handled in false information cases in Estonian courts so far. The general provision (art. 139 of the LOA) that regulates the question of injured party's contributory fault does not rule out the possibility of reducing the defendant's liability in case of injured party's simple negligence; however, the authors find that if the offender has disclosed false information intentionally the injured party's contributory fault may form a basis for decreasing the offender's liability only in case of intentional behaviour or at least gross negligence. 40 For example, it is widespread that goods (food, hotel rooms, etc.) are made to look much better on photos than they do in reality. Therefore, there are probably many hotel guests who have been ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 1 2014
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Regarding the question of whether directors should be only held liable for active misrepresentation or also for remaining silent, the authors support the position of German and Spanish courts that directors should be held liable for nondisclosure as well. The authors are of the opinion that not telling important information may influence a creditor's decision regarding a transaction similarly to active misrepresentation. Although one may state that active misrepresentation is somehow a more grave violation than just remaining silent, it may often simply be a question of choosing the right 'sales technique' in order to cause the other party in a contract to make a mistake. 41 A director should not escape liability simply for not actively lying if the other party does make a mistake due to the fact that recognizably important information is deliberately hidden from that party.
The other party's own negligence in verifying information should not provide grounds to discharge the director from liability unless incorrectness of information was clearly obvious, but the creditor still recklessly relied on that information. The authors are of the opinion that within economic circulation a creditor should not have to presume that s/he is being deceived and, therefore, should not always have to check the statements made by the other contracting party from independent sources. Furthermore, a director has a very simple and inexpensive way to refrain from liability-namely, by disclosing accurate information to the other contracting party.
In conclusion, the authors find that direct liability of a director is justified in circumstances where a director intentionally and significantly influenced an injured party's decision regarding the conclusion of a transaction or important conditions of the transaction by disclosing false information (or by hiding information).
A DIRECTOR'S PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION OR FOR CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO
As seen from the previous section, if a director has intentionally made untrue statements and through that violated the trust of a third party to a great extent, the third party is entitled to demand compensation for the damage caused by the director. However, it can be presumed that proving the intent of a director may be often quite complicated, which is why the purpose of further analysis is to establish disappointed when entering their hotel room and thinking back at the beautiful photos they saw previously at the web page or in a tourist brochure. The lastly mentioned does not, however, mean that a fraud has been committed because in perfect light conditions and from the right angle the hotel room probably does look like on the picture. 41 For example, if a director of a company that sells used cars knows that the odometer reading of a car has been altered, is there a difference whether the director actively lies claiming that the odometer's reading is correct or allows the buyer to look at the reading and does not say anything about the fact that the reading has been altered (i.e., allows the buyer to fall into the trap)? In both cases the buyer would not have bought the vehicle if he/she had known the correct reading. Simply the existence of long-time business relationships has not been found sufficient for the creation of personal reliance by courts. 64 An impression in the contracting partner must be created by the director that the director himself/herself is responsible for fulfilment of the contract as required even if the contracting partner does not trust the company or trusts it only a little.
65
There is no special regulation on precontractual liability in the Spanish CC. It is typical of Spanish tort law that, due to lack of regulation of the CC The above mentioned principles of good faith and neminem laedere are also applicable to companies and their directors. As a rule, only the company as the party to precontractual negotiations is held liable for damage caused to the other party during precontractual negotiations in Spain as well. As an exception, the director may be held directly liable to third parties as well; however, unlike German and English courts, Spanish courts do not seem to find it relevant that there should be special trust or assumption of responsibility between the director and injured party. 69 In order to enforce a direct claim it is essential to ascertain that the wrongful behavior of a director would have caused damage to the injured party's economical sphere directly and not reflectively (i.e., not through decrease in assets of the company). 70 According to Spanish judicial practice, the argument of direct damage strengthens the cause-and-effect relationship and enables to avoid interpretations that would make the director jointly liable for company's obligations. 71 Although causing damage to a party to negotiations through negligent misstatement may, in principle, also be an unlawful act of a director, Spanish 76 The Supreme Court's Judgment 3-2-1-39-13, of April 30, 2013. In the referred case a company sold an apartment by hiding from the buyer that the apartment is encumbered by a large financial obligation for the benefit of the apartment association. Although the director was not a defendant in the given case, the Supreme Court, among other things, referred to the possibility that the director (who represented the company during the conclusion of the transaction) could be held jointly liable with the company on the basis of c.i.c. 77 The Supreme Court's Judgment 3-2-1-62-13, of June 5, 2013 . In that case a company that sold security devices to another company was not the owner of the devices. The purchase agreement was financed through leasing and the lessor was to become the owner of that equipment. However, as the seller was unable to transfer the right of ownership, the lessor never became the owner of the equipment. The lessor filed a claim against the director of the seller on the basis that the director hid the fact that the equipment did not really belong to the seller. 79 Of course other preconditions for compensation of damage, such as unlawfulness and wrongfulness of violation, causing damage to the injured party and existence of cause-and-effect relationship between the violation and damage, must exist as well. 80 Ascertainment of cause-and-effect relationship is an unavoidable precondition for enforcing a claim for damage in other countries studied in the article as well. 81 If a director is also a shareholder, his/her dividend income may depend on it; however, even if the director is merely a paid employee, his/her income (e.g., annual bonus) will still depend on how well the company is doing.
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those cases on the tortious basis explained in the previous section of this article (i.e intentional misrepresentation).
DIRECTOR'S PROSPECTUS LIABILITY
In individual cases liability of a director for making untrue statements may also proceed from a statutory provision. That liability can come into question together with director's liability for c.i.c. or deceit, but it may also be an additional basis of liability. Above all, the purpose of those provisions is to protect a third party for damage arising from violation of obligation stipulated in the provision. As liability for breach of statutory duties can often occur in conjunction with negligence, it will significantly reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof in comparison to a situation where the plaintiff is required to prove intent of the tortfeasor.
Next, we will analyze a protection provision that is important from the viewpoint of directors' liability for misrepresentation and that has been transferred into the law of the EU member states on the basis of article 6 of the European In addition, prospectus liability on the basis of the above-mentioned culpa in contrahendo has been found possible in the BGH. When acquiring securities on the basis of prospectus then usually the prospectus is the most important source document for making investment decisions, which is why the creators of prospectuses attain a special reliance status. Differently from the usual c.i.c.
liability situation, a special reliance status does not have to take place between a director and a third party, instead it is proceeded from a so called typified reliance,
i.e., the investor is not required to even be personally acquainted with the director;
in order for liability to come about, it is enough if the director is part of the group of people responsible for the prospectus.
90
According to an alternative opinion, Prof. Helmut Koziol has found that in the case of prospectus liability, there is no direct contact between injured parties and people responsible for the prospectus, which is why prospectus liability cannot be grounded by improvements to c.i.c. principle. However, similarly to the position of the BGH, Prof. Koziol also agrees that data presented in the prospectus makes investors feel special trust and thus, liability of people responsible for the prospectus must be affirmed if that trust is violated. unexpectedly finds out that a director of an Estonian issuer is not personally liable for disclosure of false information in the prospectus. Therefore, it would be advisable to alter the European Prospectus Directive and through that also the national legislation so that the issue of directors' prospectus liability would be solved principally in a same way in all member states.
The authors find that personal liability of directors for disclosure of false information in a prospectus should not be precluded. Information contained in prospectuses has determinative importance for investors when making investment decisions and when looking at the bigger picture, and the functioning of securities market as a whole is dependent on investors' trust for information presented in prospectuses. When investors have little trust in the information contained in prospectuses, it is less likely that companies will raise new capital and that in turn will have a negative influence on business activity in society as a whole. For that reason the authors are in favor of full liability of directors for compensating damage caused by disclosing false information in prospectuses. According to the authors, the restriction which is stipulated in the German Securities Prospectus Act and states that a director must have personal interest in emission for him/her to be held liable is not advisable. The authors find that the purpose of the regulation should be protection of investors and the personal interests of directors should be irrelevant at this point.
CONCLUSIONS
Tortious bases of liability for deceit and negligent misrepresentation known in the common law system are alien to the legal systems of the countries studied in this article; however, that does not mean that directors are not held liable in those countries for disclosure of false information. It has been found through analysis that tortious claims that are filed in England on the basis of deceit can be similarly filed as tortious claims in Germany, Spain and Estonia as well by reasoning the claims with intentional behavior contrary to good morals or with dolo grave. The principle of culpa in contrahendo corresponds best to negligent misrepresentation and in many cases it allows the courts to reach similar outcomes when solving cases. In addition, the liability of a director may arise when a specific protection provision is violated, as was analyzed under prospectus liability.
All in all it can be said that directors cannot be held personally liable to creditors for any kind of disclosure of false information. When untrue statements are intentionally disclosed, directors are not liable for every kind of exaggeration and glorification of situations, but false information has to have a significant The authors find that prospectus liability of directors should be more consonant in the countries studied in the article, since the securities market acts across borders and directors' prospectus liability regulation at the EU level should not come as a surprise to an investor from another member state. In cases of public emission it is advisable to hold directors more strictly personally liable as it will make the securities market as a whole more reliable to investors. Directors, however, should be able to limit their liability to a reasonable extent by involving enough competent specialists in the process of drafting prospectuses. 
